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POWERING MARY JANE: MARIJUANA
AND ELECTRIC PUBLIC UTILITIES
RYAN DADGARI 1
The discourse surrounding legalizing marijuana use and cultivation
is full of political, legal, and economic voices. While some discussions
address the high electricity consumption of marijuana grow operations
and their effects on the energy grid, few—if any—discuss whether or not
public utilities could be held federally liable for supplying power to ma-
rijuana grows and incentivizing growers to use more energy efficient
methods. Just as banks, doctors and lawyers could be at risk for provid-
ing their services to this emerging industry, so too could public utilities.
In some cases, utilities that refuse to provide service to state-legal mari-
juana grow operations experience theft of electricity.  This occurs in
states where marijuana cultivation is both legal and prohibited. Until
Congress intervenes, public utilities must continue to operate in legal
limbo if they supply power and incentives to marijuana grows. Legiti-
mate state-legal marijuana businesses face a persistent dearth of re-
sources that other legitimate businesses receive, and high energy
consumption will increasingly strain our overburdened power grids.
These issues could be addressed through a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission order, Congressional action, or Supreme Court rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, marijuana use has gone from illicit and
underground to mostly decriminalized. In some cases, it has become a
legalized substance vying for both recreational and medicinal recogni-
tion. Increasingly widespread marijuana use over the last two decades
1 Ryan Dadgari is a graduate of Texas A&M School of Law, Class of 2016. He has a passion
for the legal and business aspects of Marijuana Law. As a law student, he was one of the first
students in the nation to participate in a class exclusively relating to Marijuana Law. He has acquired
Bachelors in Business Administration in both Finance and International Business from California
State University Sacramento and was employed in various finance related positions prior to
attending law school.
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spawned a robust industry now experiencing exponential growth without
the promise of basic services, like electric energy. As medicinal and rec-
reational use of marijuana is decriminalized at the state level, many pub-
lic utility companies are caught in a legal and ethical dilemma. Public
utilities have expressed concern that providing services to businesses like
marijuana grow operations (grows) could expose them to federal prose-
cution. However, selectively withholding services violates state man-
dates to provide electric energy to customers in their territory.
Understandably, these public utilities are torn between fulfilling their
statutory mandates and arousing the ire of federal prosecutors.
This article analyzes whether public utilities can be held liable for
racketeering under federal Racketeer Influenced and Criminal Organiza-
tion (RICO) statutes or aiding and abetting laws for providing or incen-
tivizing electric service to marijuana growers and concludes that it is
unlikely, absent specific circumstances. Part II of this article discusses
the legalities of the marijuana industry, including federal prohibition of
marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), legalization of
marijuana within the borders of individual states, and the evolution of the
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) selective enforcement of the federal pro-
hibition on marijuana. Part III analyzes the struggle between federalism
and states’ rights, addressing the regulation of local electric energy distri-
bution and the effects that the Interstate Commerce Clause, federal legis-
lation such as the RICO statutes, and aiding and abetting statutes may
have on public utilities. Part IV considers whether public utilities can
legally provide service and incentives to marijuana growers under the
current federal prohibition. Part V examines the high-energy consump-
tion of marijuana grows, and the effects of consumption on the energy
industry; this section also proposes interim solutions to the problems
public utilities face until the legalization of marijuana is achieved at the
federal level. Part VI of this paper provides recommendations to solve
problems that public utilities and marijuana grows face under current
law.
II. MARIJUANA INDUSTRY “LEGALIZATION”
To understand the complicated circumstances facing public utilities,
it is important to first understand the changing landscape as it relates to
marijuana laws. This section discusses the illegality of marijuana at the
federal level under the CSA and marijuana’s status in states that have
voted to legalize it. The section concludes with a discussion depicting the
DOJ’s evolving stance on enforcing the federal prohibition of marijuana.
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A. WHY GROWING IS FEDERALLY ILLEGAL
It was legal to grow and consume marijuana for most of American
history.2 In fact, U.S. physicians began to recognize marijuana’s thera-
peutic potential as early as the 1840s. Between 1850 and 1941, the medi-
cal community recognized cannabis as a medicinal treatment in the
United States Pharmacopoeia, a listing of federally approved drugs used
in the United States.3 However, in the 1910s, several states criminalized
the drug.4
Throughout the 1920s and 30s, the American public began to asso-
ciate marijuana with African Americans, Latino migrant workers, and
crime.5 In 1932, Congress passed the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, which
regulated narcotic drugs, in hopes of controlling interstate crime thought
to be caused by the increasing use of marijuana.6 After criminalization,
aspirin, morphine, and other opium-derived drugs replaced marijuana as
more potent treatments for pain and other medical conditions.7 Congress
approved the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, which placed a tax on the sale
of cannabis.8 By 1941, growing opposition from the American Medical
Association culminated in the removal of marijuana from the United
States Pharmacopoeia, after being listed as a medicine for almost a cen-
tury.9 Marijuana’s legal status continued to vary from state to state until
Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).
1. CSA – Schedule I Drug Classification of Marijuana
Due to pervasive and popular drug use among Americans in the
1960s, Congress passed the CSA in 1970.10 Lawmakers intended for the
CSA to prohibit the importation and distribution of drugs that had an
acute potential for abuse and virtually no medicinal significance.11 The
2 Mark Eddy, Medical Marijuana: Review and Analysis of Federal and State Policies, CONG.
RES. SERVICE 1 (Apr. 2, 2010), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33211.pdf.
3 Id.
4 Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L.
REV. 74, 81 (2015).
5 Id.
6 Tyler T. Flynn, The Grass is not Always Greener: A Hazed and Confused Federal Approach
to Legal Marijuana and the Resulting Impact on Mother Earth, 4 (May 12, 2015) (unpublished J.D.
thesis, Texas A&M University School of Law) (on file with author) (citing Melanie Reid, The Quag-
mire That Nobody in the Federal Government Wants to Talk About: Marijuana, 44 N.M. L. REV.
169, 170 (2014)).
7 Eddy, supra note 2, at 1.
8 Id. at 2.
9 Id. at 2-3.
10 Id. at 3; Flynn, supra note 6, at 4.
11 Flynn, supra note 6, at 4-5.
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CSA categorized drugs into five schedules according to their probability
of abuse, their medicinal usefulness, and the physical and psychological
effect on the abuser.12 The CSA classified marijuana as a Schedule I
drug along with heroin, LSD, and cocaine.13 Schedule I drugs, according
to the drafters, are drugs that: “1) have a high potential for abuse, 2) have
no currently accepted medicinal use, and 3) are not safe to use under
medical supervision.”14 Under the CSA it is illegal to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or possess with the intent to manufacture, distribute, or possess a
controlled substance.15 Violating the prohibitions under the act can
prompt unforgiving civil and criminal sanctions, and up to life in prison
for large volume trafficking offenses by manufacturers and dealers.16
Despite its illegality and the prospect of severe punishment, close to
30 million Americans admitted using some form of marijuana in 2010.17
Marijuana is now the most widely consumed illegal drug on the planet;
between 124 million and 300 million people—or 3 to 4 percent of the
global population—report using marijuana annually.18
B. STATES IN WHICH MARIJUANA IS LEGAL
The battle between the states and the federal government over the
decriminalization or legalization of marijuana began immediately after
the passage of the CSA in 1970. In March of 1972, the National Com-
mission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, also known as the Shafer Com-
mission, recommended that small amounts of marijuana should be
legalized.19 Although President Nixon created the commission, he re-
jected its recommendation and, in July of 1973, formed the Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA).20 In October of that year, Oregon
became the first of several states to decriminalize marijuana, contrary to
federal classification under the CSA .21 Unlike the Nixon administration,
President Jimmy Carter endorsed the Shafer Commission’s recommenda-
tion. In 1977, he sent a letter to Congress asking that they decriminalize
12 Id. at 5.
13 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
14 Id. at § 812(b)(1).
15 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2010).
16 Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 83; see also Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the
Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 635
(2011).
17 Flynn, supra note 6, at 5.
18 Id.
19 Milestones in U.S. Marijuana Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2013/10/27/us/marijuana-legalization-timeline.html?_r=0#/#time283_8117.
20 Id.
21 Id.
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marijuana for adults.22 Just four years later, President Reagan reversed
the course towards decriminalizing marijuana with his “war on drugs”
campaign.23 Those states that had once adopted decriminalization began
to tighten restrictions and recriminalize.24 With the Antidrug Abuse Act
of 1986 and 1988, Congress and the Reagan administration created strict
federal prison sentences for drug dealing convictions, designed the three-
strikes law which made it possible for offenders with two or more prior
convictions to be sentenced to life without parole, and established the
first national director of drug policy or “drug czar.”25
As different views than those of the federal government emerged,
marijuana policy would not change until 1996, when California voters
passed California’s Compassionate Use Act, Proposition 215 (Prop 215).
Prop 215 legalized the cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for
medical purposes, laying the groundwork for future laws across the
country.26 Sixteen years later, two States, Colorado and Washington,
took it a step further by legalizing marijuana for recreational use.27
1. Colorado
Colorado was the first state to enact legislation permitting the recre-
ational use of marijuana, and it did so by way of another first—an
amendment to the state’s constitution.28 Colorado’s state legislature
wrote the recreational marijuana law to allow regulation of marijuana in
the same way that alcohol is currently regulated in the state.29 Anyone
over 21 years of age is authorized to possess and consume marijuana in
quantities of one ounce or less, without the fear of criminal prosecu-
tion.30 Individuals who “possess more than one ounce of marijuana are
required to show proof of a debilitating medical condition or physician’s
prescription.”31 Those consuming marijuana must not do so in public or
in a way that jeopardizes others.32 Those who wish to cultivate marijuana
22 Marijuana Law Reform Timeline, NORML, http://norml.org/shop/item/marijuana-law-re
form-timeline (last visited Nov. 1, 2015); see also A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POL’Y
ALL., http://www.drugpolicy.org/new-solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war (last visited Nov.
1, 2015).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Milestones in U.S. Marijuana Laws, supra note 19.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Gina S. Warren, Regulating Pot to Save the Polar Bear: Energy and Climate Impacts of the
Marijuana Industry, 40 No. 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385, 394 (2015).
29 Id. at 394-95.
30 Id. at 395.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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for personal use can cultivate up to six cannabis plants (three of which
can be mature at any time), and must do so indoors.33 Commercial grow-
ing operations are also legal with the proper license from  the Depart-
ment of Revenue.34
2. Washington
Along with Colorado in 2012, voters in Washington passed Initia-
tive 502 allowing anyone over twenty one years of age to cultivate, pos-
sess, and consume designated amounts of marijuana privately.35 The
initiative, incorporated into the state’s Uniform Controlled Substances
Act, was intended to: 1) shift the focus of law enforcement resources
toward violent and property crimes instead of marijuana-related crimes;
2) better fund “education, health care, research, and substance abuse pre-
vention” by generating state and local tax revenue from marijuana; and
3) remove marijuana from the illegal drug organizations at play in the
black market and place it into a state-licensed and highly regulated sys-
tem.36 Washington’s regulation and licensing program controls commer-
cial marijuana at three levels: production, processing, and retail sales.
3. Other States Allowing the Recreational Use of Marijuana
In 2014, Alaska, Oregon, and Washington D.C. voters legalized rec-
reational marijuana.37 Alaska’s Ballot 2 legalized recreational marijuana
use for adults and permits the possession of one ounce and up to six
cannabis plants.38 Commercial cultivators are required to pay registration
and licensing fees, and register with the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board.39
Oregon legalized the cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana
for adults 21 and over through Oregon Measure 91.40 This measure al-
lows adults to possess one ounce or less in public and up to eight ounces
in private, and the authority to grow up to four plants for household
use.41 Oregon placed the burden of regulation on its Liquor Control
Commission, which will also be responsible for qualifying commercial
33 Id.
34 Warren, supra note 28, at 395.
35 Id. at 396.
36 Id. (referencing Uniform Controlled Substances Act, WASH REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 69.50.101-609 (2015)).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 397.
39 Id.
40 Warren, supra note 28, at 396.
41 Id. at 397.
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cultivators by requiring them to go through a state licensing process and
pay licensing fees.42
Lastly, Washington D.C. legalized the possession of marijuana
through Initiative 71, the Legalization of Possession of Minimal
Amounts of Marijuana for Personal Use Act, in 2014.43 Seventy percent
of voters chose to allow adults to possess up to two ounces of marijuana
and six plants, only three of which could be mature at any given time, for
personal use, but there are no commercial cultivation or licensing
schemes for possession included in the Act.44 Today, a total of twenty
three states and Washington D.C. have deviated from the federal govern-
ment’s prohibition and claims of marijuana being a harmful drug with no
medicinal significance.45 These states have either decriminalized or le-
galized the use and cultivation of marijuana within their boundaries.46
This progression forced the federal government and the Department of
Justice to evaluate its views towards marijuana.
C. DOJ’S EVOLUTION ON MARIJUANA
The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) views on marijuana evolved in
recent years due to state legalization, budget reductions, and the Obama
administration’s stance of non-enforcement, which allows states to ex-
periment with marijuana legalization. Not long after California passed
Proposition 215, the federal government worked tirelessly to block its
implementation by targeting physicians who recommended medical ma-
rijuana, patients, and dispensaries.47 Drug-czar Barry McCaffrey an-
nounced that the government‘s aim was to rescind physicians’
registrations with the DEA if they recommended marijuana use, leaving
physicians unable to prescribe any controlled substance.48 In Conant v.
Walters, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the DEA’s course
of action was an unconstitutional infringement on the First Amendment
rights of physicians, because it limited the physician’s capacity to speak
“frankly and openly” with patients.49 The ruling forced the DEA to take
42 Id.
43 Id. at 397-398.
44 Id. at 398.
45 Id. at 391.
46 Id.
47 Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an Age of
State Reforms, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 555, 566-67 (2010).
48 Id. at 567.
49 Id. (citing Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639-40 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concur-
ring) (noting that the DEA’s planned revocation policy would mean that physicians who spoke
“candidly to their patients about the potential benefits of medical marijuana [would] risk losing their
license to write prescriptions, which would prevent them from functioning as doctors”)).
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the only other viable option to disrupt the sale of medicinal marijuana:
the more expensive and time consuming route of enforcement against the
actors involved in the medical marijuana market.50
This new course of action proved to be more fruitful for the
agency’s war on drugs according to the outcomes of court rulings.51 In
1997, the federal government sought an injunction against six medical
marijuana cooperatives under the CSA in United States v. Oakland Can-
nabis Buyers’ Cooperative.52 The Defendants successfully argued that
the medical necessity defense applied to their activities.53 The Supreme
Court reversed and allowed the injunction, holding that the medical ne-
cessity defense was not valid against charges of manufacturing and dis-
tributing marijuana since “the balance had already been struck against a
medical necessity exception” under the CSA.54
Four years later, Gonzales v. Raich raised a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge against California’s medical marijuana law.55 In this case, DEA
agents raided the home of Dianne Monson (Monson), a California medi-
cal marijuana patient.  The DEA agents seized six marijuana plants from
Monson’s residence.56 The government ultimately did not file charges
against Monson after the raid.
However, the incident prompted Monson to join fellow medical ma-
rijuana patient Angel Raich and two caregivers in filing suit for an in-
junction against the DEA to prevent the agency from enforcing the CSA
against them for cultivating medicinal marijuana.57 The plaintiffs sup-
ported their position with two recent Supreme Court decisions that re-
stricted the federal government’s authority under the Commerce Clause:
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison.58 These two cases
held that “noncommercial“ activity was beyond the reach of federal law
and the commerce power of the government.59 Monson and Raich argued
that marijuana cultivation for personal medicinal use was similar to other
noncommercial activity, like possessing a gun in a gun free school
zone.60 In the prior decision, the Lopez court held that possession of a
gun in a school zone was noncommercial activity that fell outside the
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 568. (citing U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001)).
53 U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 483-84 (2001).
54 Kreit, supra note 47, at 568.
55 Id.
56 Id. (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Kreit, supra note 47, at 568-69.
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federal government’s authority under the Commerce Clause, and struck
down a provision making that activity a federal crime under the Gun Free
School Zone Act of 1990.61
As with other such cases, the Ninth Circuit ruled for the plaintiffs in
Raich.62  However, the Supreme Court reversed in a 6-3 decision, hold-
ing that regulating “the possession and noncommercial cultivation of ma-
rijuana was a necessary part of Congress’ efforts to criminalize the
interstate market for the drug under the Controlled Substances Act.”63
The majority distinguished the Raich case and the prior Lopez and Mor-
rison cases on the ground that regulating the possession and cultivation
of marijuana for personal use was an indispensable component of regu-
lating larger economic activity, “in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”64
With both the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop. and Raich cases,
the Supreme Court clarified that federal officials could prosecute medical
marijuana cultivators, providers, and patients constitutionally—a power
that the federal government has exercised numerous times over the last
decade and a half.65 Despite the Supreme Court’s decisions, California
had over 700 medical marijuana collectives openly operating with the
acceptance or support of city and county governments, serving approxi-
mately 300,000 to 400,000 qualified patients by 2009.66
Despite its best efforts, the federal government failed to stop the
spread of marijuana laws.67 In 2009, U.S. Deputy Attorney General
David W. Ogden issued the DOJ’s first memorandum for prosecutorial
guidance on medicinal marijuana enforcement, signaling the first step in
the government’s shift away from full enforcement.68 Ogden suggested
that prosecuting seriously ill people using marijuana as a physician-rec-
ommended treatment consistent with applicable state law, or caregivers
operating in “clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law”
to provide marijuana to individuals, is “unlikely to be an efficient use of
limited federal resources.”69
61 Id. at 569.
62 Id. at 569; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
63 Kreit, supra note 47, at 569.
64 Id. (citing U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 570 (citing Roger Parloff, How Medical Marijuana Became Legal, FORTUNE 141,
144 (Sept. 18, 2009)).
67 Kreit, supra note 47, at 570-71.
68 Id. at 571; see also William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 513, 515 (2015).
69 Memorandum from David W. Ogden, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen. on Investigations and Prose-
cutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana 2 (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice
.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf.
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To ensure that this recommendation did not undermine the govern-
ment’s ability to enforce federal laws, U.S. Deputy Attorney General
James M. Cole (Cole) issued another memorandum to prosecutors in
2011.70 In the 2011 memo, Cole clarified that the DOJ remained commit-
ted to enforcing the CSA in all states and that the Ogden memo was
never intended to shield “large-scale, privately operated industrial mari-
juana cultivation centers” from “federal enforcement action and prosecu-
tion,” even if they complied with state law.71 This memo seemed to
illustrate the DOJ’s willingness to prosecute any large grow operation.
Two years later, Cole issued another memorandum in response to Colo-
rado and Washington legalizing recreational marijuana, signaling another
step towards an even more selective attitude in federal enforcement. Cole
suggested that the DOJ would not interfere with states that legalized ma-
rijuana-related conduct, implemented a robust and effective system of
regulation, and showed a willingness to enforce their laws and regula-
tions if they did not undermine the eight chief priorities of federal en-
forcement.72 The central federal enforcement priorities are:
(1) Preventing distribution of marijuana to minors; (2) Preventing ma-
rijuana revenue from funding criminal enterprises, gangs or cartels; (3)
Preventing marijuana from moving out of states where it is legal; (4)
Preventing use of state-legal marijuana sales as a cover for illegal ac-
tivity; (5) Preventing violence and use of firearms in growing or dis-
tributing marijuana; (6) Preventing drugged driving or exacerbation of
other adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana
use; (7) Preventing growing marijuana on public lands; and (8)
Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property.73
In evaluating an alleged violation, Cole advised prosecutors that they
should assess conduct on a case-by-case basis and consider not only the
size or commercial nature of the operation, but also whether the state has
a strong and effective regulatory system in place, the operation’s compli-
ance with the state’s regulatory system, and whether the operation’s con-
duct implicates one or more of the federal enforcement priorities.74 The
70 William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 65 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 513, 515-16 (2015).
71 Memorandum from James M. Cole, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen. on Guidance Regarding the
Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use 1-2 (June 9, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-ma
rijuana-use.pdf.
72 Memorandum from James M. Cole, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen. on Guidance Regarding Mari-
juana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/30520138291327568
57467.pdf.
73 Id. at 1-2.
74 Id.
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DOJ also stated that it would not sue to block laws legalizing marijuana
in the states and the District of Columbia, which some proponents hailed
as a step toward ending the drug’s prohibition.75
This trend has since reversed with the new presidential administra-
tion. In a memorandum issued January 4, 2018, current U.S. Attorney
Jeff Sessions (Sessions) rescinded guidance allowing states to implement
their own marijuana laws.76 With this return to federal marijuana en-
forcement, federal prosecutors are free to enforce federal laws against
marijuana, putting all actors involved in the marijuana industry—includ-
ing utilities—in jeopardy.77
III. FEDERALISM VERSUS STATES’ RIGHTS
Since the DOJ decided to follow a policy of selective enforcement,
the states found that they have some leeway in legalizing marijuana and
managing the use of the drug.78 State laws that allow for either medicinal
or recreational marijuana are in direct conflict with the federal ban under
the CSA.79 However, as the DOJ noted, so long as the industry is regu-
lated by a strong and effective state regulatory system—and the entities
involved do not impede upon the federal enforcement priorities—the in-
dustry will be left to state regulation and enforcement.80
In spite of the federal government’s policy, the reality of the federal
ban’s existence still threatens the services that regulated commercial
businesses need to thrive.81 For example, marijuana-related entities have
difficulty accessing banking services in states where marijuana is legal.82
The American Bar Association has not clarified whether lawyers can
counsel in-state entities without being held liable for criminal conspiracy
or found guilty under accomplice liability.83 And at a time when Western
states are facing water shortages due to drought, the Federal Bureau of
Reclamation recently stated that “Reclamation will not approve use of
75 Milestones in U.S. Marijuana Laws, supra note 19.
76 Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, U.S. Att’y Gen. on Marijuana Enforcement
(Jan. 4, 2018),  https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download.
77 Id.
78 Baude, supra note 70, at 516.
79 Julie Andersen Hill, Marijuana, Federal Power, and the States: Banks, Marijuana, and
Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 599 (2015).
80 Cole Memo, supra note 72.
81 Baude, supra note 70, at 516.
82 Hill, supra note 79, at 600.
83 Baude, supra note 70, at 517.
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Reclamation facilities of water in the cultivation of marijuana.”84 While
the industry continues to grow exponentially, many marijuana-related
companies face multiple challenges that companies in other industries do
not. The primary challenge is federalism.
Public utilities are caught in the same quagmire. By servicing and
incentivizing marijuana grows, these utilities risk federal prosecution;
however, withholding services and incentives from grows within their
territory violates state mandates requiring utilities to service and protect
all customers within their territory. To analyze this issue in more detail, it
is important to know how electric energy is regulated, and how federal
laws would apply to public utilities that provide electricity to marijuana
grows.
A. WHO REGULATES ELECTRIC ENERGY?
The energy delivery industry is a billion-dollar business.85 In fact, it
is larger than any other industry in the United States today.86 Weighing
in at “roughly twice the size of telecommunications and almost thirty
percent larger than the U.S-based manufacturers of automobiles and
trucks,” electric utilities necessitate “far more investment than the aver-
age manufacturing industry and even ten to 100 times more per unit of
delivered energy than gas and oil systems.”87 Regulation of the electric
industry was once the sole jurisdiction of the states, but over the last 100
years, federal laws and regulations have slowly eroded the bright lines
that once separated federal and state jurisdiction.88 Today, “the network
of interconnected electric facilities is national in scope,” and presents
problems that call for national solutions in some cases and local solutions
in others.89
The Federal Energy Commission (FERC), an independent federal
agency, oversees the regulation of the electric industry. The Federal
Water Power Act of 1920, the first major piece of legislation to address
the electricity industry, established what would eventually become
84 Reclamation Manuel PEC TRMR-63, Use of Reclamation Water or Facilities for Activities
Prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 1, 2 (Mar. 20,
2015), http://www.usbr.gov/recman/temporary_releases/pectrmr-63.pdf.
85 Gina S. Warren, Vanishing Power Lines and Emerging Distributed Generation, 4 WAKE
FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 347, 354-55 (2014).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 354-355.
88 Everest Schmidt, A Call for Federalism: The Role of State Government in Federally Con-
trolled Energy Markets, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 574, 577-78 (2013).
89 Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment
in Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 588 (2005).
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FERC.90 This Act purported to carve out a portion of states’ jurisdiction
to be regulated by the federal government and created FERC’s predeces-
sor, the Federal Power Commission (FPC), to oversee the industry’s reg-
ulatory obligations.91
In 1935, Congress passed the Public Utilities Act, which created
Title I, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act (giving the Securities
and Exchange Commission authority to regulate utility holding compa-
nies) and expanded and renamed the Federal Water Power Act to the
Federal Power Act (FPA), Title II.92 The FPA expanded FPC jurisdiction
to include “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and
the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce” and “all
facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy.”93 The FPC’s
jurisdiction expanded yet again with the passage of the Natural Gas Act
(NGA) of 1938, which placed the “transportation of natural gas in inter-
state commerce” under its authority.94 However, the NGA did not grant
the commission jurisdiction over “any other transportation or sale, local
distribution,” or “production or gathering” of natural gas.95
Another major piece of legislative authority for the agency was the
Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, which expanded the
agency’s jurisdiction to include the regulation of oil pipelines and reorga-
nized the FPC as FERC.96 The last piece of authoritative legislation, the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, amended the FPA to en-
courage the development of renewable energy resources and promote en-
ergy conservation, and gave FERC oversight of these objectives.97 With
the nation moving increasingly toward interconnectedness, where infra-
structure or borders are no longer the clear demarcation of jurisdiction,
Congress continues to increase the federal government’s regulatory au-
thority over the industry. As the history of FERC demonstrates, Congress
progressively whittled away at states’ rights to regulate electric energy
by implementing laws that place more control in the hands of the federal
government.
90 Schmidt, supra note 88, at 580.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 580-81.
93 Id. at 582 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006)) (“A wholesale transaction is ‘a sale of
electric energy to any person for resale.’” § 824(d). A “retail sale” is a sale directly to an end-user.
See Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517 n. 12 (1947)).
94 Kyle Chadwick, Crossed Wires: Federal Preemption of States’ Authority over Retail
Wheeling or Electricity, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 191, 204-05 (1996).
95 Id. at 205.
96 History of FERC, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/students/ferc/his-
tory.asp (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
97 What is a Qualifying Facility?, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www
.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp.
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The United States’ Constitution created a federalist system in which
both the federal government—via FERC—and the states—via state pub-
lic utility commissions—oversee the regulation of today’s electric indus-
try.98 Section 201(b) of the FPA (now codified as 16 U.S.C. § 824)
declares that federal regulation applies to those parts of business that
consist of the transmission and sale at wholesale of electric energy in
interstate commerce, but does not apply to those matters that are subject
to regulation by the states.99 Under this bright line, Congress intended
the FPA to occupy the field of transmission and wholesale sales in inter-
state commerce.100 States cannot have jurisdiction over subject matter
that is regulated by FERC or any other federal entity.101
FERC states that its statutory authority grants it regulatory power
over electric energy transmissions in interstate commerce. FERC also
regulates the wholesale sales of electric energy by public utilities in in-
terstate commerce and all facilities for such transmission. FERC’s juris-
diction includes corporate activities and transactions of public utilities
such as accounting, mergers, and securities issuances. FERC also main-
tains siting authority over hydroelectric and nuclear generation.102
Under the FPA, the Commission has authority over public utilities
defined as “any person who owns or operates” a facility used for “the
transmission of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”103
FERC asserts that the FPA does not give it authority over local electric
energy distribution, the retail sale of electricity to end users, and the sit-
ing of generation facilities that are not nuclear or hydroelectric in na-
ture.104 Therefore, these responsibilities fall to the States. Since the
passage of the FPA, utility companies, states, and the federal government
have continuously called upon the Supreme Court to assist in determin-
ing where the jurisdiction of the federal government ends and where state
regulation begins. Through a series of decisions, the court interpreted the
intent of Congress regarding federal jurisdiction in cases involving the
movement of electricity under the FPA.
98 Jeffery S. Dennis, Federalism, Electric Industry Restructuring, and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause: Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia and State Restrictions on the Development of Merchant
Power Plants, 43 NAT. RES. J. 615, 658 (2003).
99 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2015).
100 Chadwick, supra note 94, at 208.
101 Id.
102 Lawrence R. Greenfield, An Overview of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and
Federal Regulation of Public Utilities in the United States 1, 10 (Dec. 2010), http://www.ferc.gov/
about/ferc-does/ferc101.pdf.
103 Id. at 11 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824(e)).
104 Id. at 12.
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1. Intent and Jurisdiction of the FPA
The Supreme Court has considered the congressional intent behind
the FPA and how it affects FERC’s jurisdiction multiple times since the
law’s enactment.105 In the 1943 case Jersey Central Power & Light Co.
v. FPC, the Court determined that the FPA’s principal function was to
allow a federal agency the authority to regulate electric energy sales
across state lines.106 Two years later, in Connecticut Light and Power
Co. v. Federal Power Commission, the Court quoted an FPC Commis-
sioner as saying that the Act “is designed to . . . fill the gap in the present
State regulation of electric utilities” and that it was “conceived entirely
as a supplement to, and not a substitution for State Regulation.”107
Specifically, a House Report cited by the Court noted that the Act
was “drawn as to be a complement to and in no sense a usurpation of
State regulatory authority and contain throughout directions to the Fed-
eral Power Commission to receive and consider the views of State com-
missions.”108 Another House Report regarding a revision of the Act
confirmed “the policy of Congress [was] to extend . . . regulation to those
matters which cannot be regulated by the States and to assist the States in
the exercise of their regulatory powers, but not to impair or diminish the
powers of any State Commission.”109 Thus, the Court held that while
Congress intended the Act’s jurisdiction to follow the surge of electricity
into interstate commerce, the Act’s language allows it to “extend only to
those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”110 In
doing so, the Court was sure to note the complexity of regulating an
industry such as electricity, where any part of the supply that comes from
outside a state may be present in every distribution facility that is con-
nected to the network.111 The Court stated that, had the Act not placed an
artificial limitation on regulation, federal jurisdiction would reach “a
toaster on the breakfast table.”112
In Federal Power Commission v. Southern California Edison Co.,
the Court determined that Congress intended to draw a bright line to
distinguish between state and federal jurisdiction.113 Finding that it was
105 Dennis, supra note 98, at 625-26.
106 Schmidt, supra note 88, at 582 (citing 319 U.S. 61, 67-68 (1943)).
107 Id. (citing 324 U.S. 515, 525 (1945)).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Dennis, supra note 98, at 625-26 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2000)).
111 Id. at 626.
112 Id.
113 Schmidt, supra note 88, at 583 (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376
U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964)).
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the intent of Congress to codify a strict distinction between local and
national jurisdiction, the Court held that Congress, through the FPA, ulti-
mately authorized federal jurisdiction over wholesale sales and state reg-
ulation over retail sales.114 The Court explained that Congress enacted
the FPA due to previous court decisions establishing the pervasive notion
that a state cannot regulate wholesale transactions but can regulate retail
sales.115 In New York v. FERC, the Court upheld that the FPA extended
federal jurisdiction to those electric energy matters previously under state
control, which indirectly related to interstate commerce.116 The Court
also stated that the Act preserved state jurisdiction and was replete with
statements describing Congress’ intent to do so.117 Thus, the Court drew
the line making it easier to identify regulators of the electric industry.
B. INTERSTATE COMMERCE
While states regulate the retail sale and local distribution of electric-
ity, almost all electricity delivered to consumers in the U.S. ultimately
passes through FERC’s jurisdiction.118 Due to the interconnected nature
of the grid119 and untraceable nature of electricity,120 Congress and the
courts consider electric energy as interstate commerce.121 As a result, the
Commerce Clause is one of the federal government’s enforcement tools.
In Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation v. Arkansas Public Ser-
vice Commission, the Supreme Court cited several previous cases regard-
ing electricity and natural gas. The Court explained that Congress
intended for the FPA to adopt the bright line in Attleboro, where federal
jurisdiction was limited to the wholesale of electricity and retail sale to
the end user was wholly under state jurisdiction.122 However, the Court
rejected this distinction, and instead looked to its general trend in Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence that calls for each case to be evaluated on
“the nature of the state regulation involved, the objective of the state, and
114 Chadwick, supra note 94, at 199.
115 Steven Ferrey, State Wars-the Empire Strikes Back: The Federal/state Constitutional
Power Confrontation, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2013) (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal.
Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 214).
116 Julia E. Sullivan, The Intersection of Federally Regulated Power Markets and State En-
ergy and Environmental Goals, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 474, 481-82 (2015).
117 Schmidt, supra note 88, at 611-12.
118 Andrew H. Meyer, Federal Regulatory Barriers to Grid-Deployed Energy Storage, 39
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 479, 484 (2014).
119 Id. at 505.
120 Ferrey, supra note 115, at 55.
121 Dennis, supra note 98, at 625-26.
122 Arkansas Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
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the effect of the regulation upon the national interest in the
commerce.”123
In the more recent General Motors Corporation v. Tracy, the Court
found that retail sales to domestic consumers regulated by the state were
not immune from ordinary Commerce Clause jurisprudence.124 However,
this ruling diverged from the precedent the Court set in cases involving
both the FPA and the NGA that upheld the exemption of state regulation
of in-state retail sales from dormant Commerce Clause attacks.125 The
Supreme Court denied hearing two cases expected to clarify this rul-
ing.126 For that reason, this article makes arguments consistent with the
traditional view that state regulation of in-state retail sales is exempt
from attack under the dormant Commerce Clause. Therefore, states and
public utilities are not under threat of federal action under the Commerce
Clause for encouraging public utilities to provide electric service and ef-
ficiency incentives to state-legal marijuana grows; however, the cultiva-
tion of marijuana is not exempt from Congressional regulation.
In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court held that there was a rational basis
for Congress to regulate in-state marijuana cultivation, because it affects
price and market conditions whether it is grown for personal use or for
the express purpose of being sold in the interstate market.127 The court
noted that marijuana cultivated for both purposes is a fungible commod-
ity, with well-established interstate markets that are susceptible to fluctu-
ations in supply and demand based on the introduction of personal
consumption into the national market.128 When the effects of individual
producers are combined, Congress can rationally expect its actions to
have substantial effects on interstate commerce.129
With this decision, the Court acknowledged that the broad-regula-
tory scheme principle was a constitutional and effective means of regu-
123 Id. at 379.
124 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 291 (1997).
125 Id. at 291-92.
126 See Fiordaliso v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 1583 (3rd Cir. 2014), petition for cert.
filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3742 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015) (No. 14-694), and cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3742
(U.S.Apr. 25, 2016) (No. 14-694) (on file at http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fiordaliso-
v-ppl-energyplus-llc/); CPV Power Development v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 1583 (3rd Cir.
2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3742 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015) (No. 14-634), and cert. de-
nied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3742 (U.S. Apr. 25, 2016) (No. 14-634), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/
cases/cpv-power-development-inc-v-ppl-energyplus-llc/.
127 Kenneth R. Thomas, The Power to Regulate Commerce: Limits on Congressional Power,
Congressional Research Service 1, 14 (May 16, 2014) (citing Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th
Cir. 2003), rev’d, sub nom; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RL32844.pdf.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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lating a presumably in-state activity, in lieu of a jurisdictional element.130
The Court demonstrated that, through the Commerce Clause, local culti-
vation of marijuana can be regulated without a case-by-case analysis or
requiring a jurisdictional addition to the CSA.131 Therefore, even if a
jurisdictional element existed in the CSA, case-by-case analysis would
be bypassed;  federal statutes regulate the cultivation of marijuana and
offer a rational basis for Congress to believe that failure to regulate mari-
juana cultivation would undercut the overall economic scheme.132 As a
result, Congress can regulate activities by devising broad regulatory
schemes such as the CSA, even if the activities would fail a case-by-case
analysis in statutes that incorporated a jurisdictional element.133
Accordingly, marijuana grows are subject to Congressional regula-
tion under the CSA and the Commerce Clause, even though the cultiva-
tion of marijuana is legal at the state level. This could lead to federal
prosecution under the CSA and under the Commerce Clause. Growers
could be found liable under the CSA because their actions are in direct
violation of the statute. They could also be liable under the Commerce
Clause for interfering with interstate commerce. As stated previously,
public utilities are exempt from prosecution under the Commerce Clause,
but may be held liable under the CSA should the court find that they
specifically intended to violate the statutory prohibitions as “racketeering
influenced criminal organizations” or if they are determined to be aiding
and abetting growers in the furtherance of prohibited activities under the
CSA.
1. Racketeer Influenced and Criminal Organizations
To prove a substantive RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. § 96, the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: “(1) an enter-
prise existed; (2) the enterprise participated in or its activities affected
interstate commerce; (3) the defendant was employed by or was associ-
ated with the enterprise; (4) the defendant conducted or participated in
the conduct of the enterprise; (5) through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.”134 According to Congress, the term “racketeering activity” refers to
many things, including “any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter,
130 Noelle Formosa, Ganging Up on Rico: Narrowing Gonzales v. Raich to Preserve the
Significance of the Jurisdictional Element As A Constitutional Limitation in the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 153 (2008).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 153-54.
133 Id. at 154.
134 Id. at 155 (quoting U.S. v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 33 (1st Cir. 2002)).
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or dealing in a controlled substance.”135 To convict under the statute,
federal prosecutors must prove the existence of a “pattern of racketeering
activity,” which is defined as at least two acts of racketeering activity.136
Even if the activity has a de minimis effect on interstate commerce,
courts can exercise jurisdiction by “proof of a probable or potential im-
pact.”137 The jurisdictional element of this statute, found under
§ 1962(c), applies to “any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce” that “conduct[s] or participate[s], directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity.”138 Given the Supreme Court’s opinion in Raich, the juris-
dictional element is not needed because the CSA is a broader scheme
statute, and the activity of cultivating marijuana for personal and com-
mercial use affects interstate commerce. Accordingly, the federal govern-
ment must only prove the elements of RICO beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the federal government pursues prosecuting public utilities under
RICO statutes, cases would likely include several elements. First, an en-
terprise that affects interstate commerce exists, no matter how it is con-
strued.139 State-legal marijuana businesses are illegal federally, and the
Raich decision established that cultivation of marijuana, even for per-
sonal medicinal use, affects interstate commerce. Commercial cultivation
of marijuana clearly affects commerce, even if the product is only sold to
in-state businesses or individuals. Likewise, public utilities are enter-
prises that affect interstate commerce, because the amount of energy they
withdraw from the grid has a direct effect on other entities—often in
different states—sharing energy from the same sources.
Under the second element, utilities participate in or affect interstate
commerce by providing electric energy services to marijuana grows.140 If
utilities deny indoor marijuana grows access to electric energy, mari-
juana production decreases substantially, which directly affects supply
and demand in interstate markets. This element is met since the output of
the grow is higher than it could be without the electric service provided
from a public utility. In addition, the public utility would utilize power
135 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
136 § 1961(5).
137 Eleanor T. Phillips et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 52 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1507, 1527-28 (2015) (quoting United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1349 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
138 Formosa, supra note 130, at 155 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
139 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“‘enterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation, asso-
ciation, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity”).
140 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”).
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from the grid to supply the energy these grows need, affecting interstate
commerce for a racketeering activity.
The third element is employment, or association. When a public
utility has no common purpose with the grower—in other words, no in-
tent to grow marijuana—the element can only be met in a few ways.141
First, if a marijuana business or one of its decision-making officers
purchases public utility stocks with the proceeds from the sale of mari-
juana and has enough of a controlling interest in the utility to affect its
decisions, association implicates the utility.142 Second, if a public utility
purchases a controlling interest in a marijuana enterprise, it implicates
the utility through association.143
Under the fourth element of participating in the conduct of the en-
terprise, incentivizing energy efficient methods could be construed as
public utilities conducting or participating in the racketeering enter-
prise.144 Unless the utility is involved in the actual management and op-
eration of the grow, this is likely not sufficient to implicate the utility for
conducting or participating in the conduct of the racketeering
enterprise.145
Under the fifth and final element, other than acts involving con-
trolled substances, it is unlikely that more than one racketeering activity
is in play where public utilities are servicing marijuana grows.146 If the
provision and maintenance of service are the only acts involved, this ele-
ment is likely not met. However, if any other racketeering activity is
present, this element is easily met.
Through the above analysis, a public utility could be found culpable
under RICO without much perversion by simply striving to comply with
state mandates to provide electric energy service to all legal entities in its
territory. Where elements three, four, and five fail here, it would not be
farfetched to see that, although highly unlikely, an imaginative prosecu-
141 Phillips, supra note 137, at 1519 (citing U.S. v. Olson, 450 F. 3d 655, 688 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“noting that the Latin Kings operated as a “well-equipped organization with a defined hierarchical
command structure,” “allegiance to a national organization,” and maintained “structure throughout
the period described”)).
142 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (prohibiting direct and indirect use or investment of any income re-
sulting from racketeering activity).
143 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
144 Phillips, supra note 137, at 1530-31 (Must make decisions in operation or management of
the enterprise to conduct or participate, but decision-making of a low degree may not constitute
participation in the enterprise’s affairs).
145 Id. at 1530.
146 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (“‘pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of racke-
teering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which
occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act
of racketeering activity.”).
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tor could arrange the facts so that a judge or jury would believe that the
elements are met. Barring an imaginative prosecutor, or a far-reaching
court, a public utility would likely not be found guilty under RICO. In
such cases, the government could turn to the aiding and abetting statute
as applied under the CSA.
2. Aiding and Abetting
Behind almost every criminal statute is a hidden feature that allows
for perpetrators of a crime and those that assist them to face the same
punishment.147 Section 2(a) of 18 U.S.C. states that “[w]hoever commits
an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”148 This
section defines aiding and abetting as “assisting in the commission of
someone else’s crime.”149 Mere knowledge of an offense without assis-
tance is not enough to be found culpable; likewise, assistance without
intent is not enough.150
Yet someone culpable under this statute need not assist in every
aspect of the criminal offense.151 Aiding and abetting is not a stand-alone
offense; it must take place either before or at the time of the substantive
offense.152 While the substantive offense must be completed for a con-
viction, the hands-on offender does not need to be named or con-
victed.153 Section 2(b) states “[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be
done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense
against the United States, is punishable as a principal.”154 Under this
language, actors and the intermediaries—innocent or not—are liable for
their conduct if, when taken together, it amounts to an offense.155 The
mens rea requirement under section 2(b) is “willfully” which, although
not entirely clear, seems to mean “intentionally.”156 The courts “believe
that an individual ‘willfully’ causes an offense when he intends the com-
mission of conduct that constitutes a crime and then intentionally uses
someone else to commit it.”157 Even if someone is unaware that his un-
147 Charles Doyle, Aiding, Abetting, and the Like: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2, CONG. RES.
SERVICE 1 (Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43769.pdf.
148 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2015).
149 Doyle, supra note 147, at 3.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 4.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).
155 Doyle, supra note 147, at 8.
156 Id.
157 Id. (citing U.S. v. Gumbs, 283 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002)).
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derlying conduct is criminal, an individual may still incur liability under
Section 2(b) if he intends to assist in the facilitation of the substantive
criminal action.158
Since “assistance” and “facilitation” are malleable terms, public
utilities rightfully have concerns when servicing marijuana grows and
offering incentives to curb high consumption.159 If the court interprets
aiding and abetting to implicate individuals who “specifically intended to
facilitate” or truly “assisted” in the commission of an act that violated the
CSA, public utilities could have some potential for liability.160 However,
because public utilities specifically intend to remain in compliance with
state mandates, an analysis of the elements of aiding and abetting demon-
strates where lines of intent can be drawn. To convict an individual for
aiding and abetting, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt: “(1) That the accused had specific intent to facilitate the commis-
sion of a crime by another; (2) That the accused had the requisite intent
of the underlying substantive offense; (3) That the accused assisted or
participated in the commission of the underlying substantive offense; and
(4) That someone committed the underlying offense.”161
In proving the first element, a public utility’s intent would be to
fulfill its duty and obligation under state mandates. Utilities act because
they are obligated to serve and protect their customers, including all
state-legal entities, by statutes enacted long before any state legalized
marijuana for medicinal or recreational purposes. Utilities do not act be-
cause they specifically intend to facilitate the commission of the federal
crime of marijuana cultivation, even if they know that the entity they are
providing electric energy to intends to violate the CSA. Rather, they spe-
cifically intend to protect the other customers within their service area,
by reducing energy consumption and theft from these marijuana grows.
Utilities accomplish this by providing service and offering incentives for
more efficient use of energy.
It is hard to conceive that a public utility would intend to cultivate
marijuana in violation of the CSA under the second element. Public utili-
ties do not set out to cultivate marijuana, but they do intend to serve and
protect their customer base per statutory mandates. Simply providing
electricity to a grower does not inherently demonstrate intent to further
the crime. In this instance, public utilities would be equally liable in aid-
ing and abetting the cultivation of marijuana. Utilities provide electricity
158 Id. at 8-9.
159 David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal
Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 591 (2013).
160 Id.
161 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 2002).
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and incentives to those growers. That action facilitates the substantive
crime of the states and the growers. Since the federal government usually
leaves the states to experiment and serve as laboratories for future policy
making ideas, this is not likely an effective way to prove these two
elements.
The third element of assistance or participation presents the same
dual interpretation problem. Federal prosecutors would likely consider
utilities to be assisting or participating in the commission of the underly-
ing substantive crime, should they provide service and incentives to ma-
rijuana grows. Once again, the same argument works in reverse; for
utilities to comply with state laws and statutory mandates, they must ser-
vice state-legal businesses and protect the other customers in their terri-
tory. Utilities accomplish this in part by offering incentives to grows to
encourage the use of energy-efficient methods of operating.
The fourth element is likely to be uncontested. Marijuana growers
intend to cultivate, distribute, and possess marijuana, committing the un-
derlying substantive crime. Like the previous RICO analysis, this analy-
sis demonstrates that by simply fulfilling their duties and obligations
under state mandates, there is a possibility that utilities could be found
culpable for aiding and abetting in the cultivation, distribution, and pos-
session of marijuana without much slanting. Where the argument in this
analysis fails under elements one, two, and possibly three, a little imagi-
nation on the part of a prosecutor could be used to prove otherwise.
Therefore, Congressional action is needed to decriminalize or legalize
marijuana, allowing public utilities to operate within their state mandates
to service and protect all the customers within their territory without the
threat of federal prosecution.
IV. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE PUBLIC UTILITIES?
While unlikely, public utilities could face criminal prosecution for
providing service to marijuana grows. If the utilities are merely operating
within the normal framework of duties and obligations under state man-
dates, their actions likely do not meet the elements required for federal
prosecution. Public utilities can therefore provide electric service and ef-
ficiency incentives to marijuana grows. Additionally, policy concerns
may necessitate that utilities provide service to marijuana grows to ad-
dress high-energy consumption, power theft, and other issues.
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A. SERVICING MARIJUANA GROWS
The language of 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) specifies that FERC does not
have jurisdiction over facilities that generate electricity, distribute elec-
tricity locally, transmit electricity only for intrastate use, or transmit elec-
tricity which is “consumed wholly by the transmitter.”162 As the Court in
FERC v. Mississippi found, Congress could have preempted the field of
electric regulation entirely, if it chose to do so.163 However, Congress
decided on a less intrusive course of action by establishing a “coopera-
tive federalism” approach, which showed deference to state authority.164
Justice O’Connor opined that this approach facilitates the frequently rec-
ognized idea that “the 50 States serve as laboratories for the development
of new social, economic, and political ideas.”165 It allows the States to
enact and administer their own regulations to meet their own particular
needs within the limits of established minimum standards set by the fed-
eral government.166
Today, nearly all states have established a regulatory structure that
expects each utility in an identifiable area to provide retail electric ser-
vice.167 State laws impose an obligation on each utility to plan for and
acquire the facilities needed to provide adequate and reliable service to
all the customers located in its service territory.168 This obligation ap-
plies universally whether it is stated explicitly in statutes or fleshed out in
case precedent.169 Therefore, public utilities have a responsibility under
state law to provide electric service to customers. As Puget Sound En-
ergy said in a statement, it “has a duty and obligation to serve customers
under Washington state law. If there’s a legal business in our service
territory that needs our services, we welcome them as a customer.”170
Accordingly, because the states regulate local distribution of elec-
tricity, public utilities can provide service to state-legal marijuana busi-
162 16 U.S.C. § 824.
163 Schmidt, supra note 88, at 587.
164 Id.
165 James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable Portfo-
lio Standards, and the Evolution of Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 97 n.144 (2004) (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788
(1982) (O’Connor, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
166 Id.
167 J. A. Bouknight, Jr., Planning for Wholesale Customer Loads in A Competitive Environ-
ment: The Obligation to Provide Wholesale Service Under the Federal Power Act, 8 ENERGY L. J.
237, 264 n.7 (1987).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Robert Walton, ‘Don’t ask, don’t tell’: How utilities are powering the marijuana industry,
INDUS. DIVE (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/dont-ask-dont-tell-how-utilities-are-
powering-the-marijuana-industry/322565/.
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nesses, as they are the type of state-legal entities that state mandates
obligate them to serve. Failing to do so would violate state regulatory
commission mandates, which could lead to penalties imposed by the
state utility commission. It is important to note that while public utilities
involved in local distribution are not regulated under the FERC, they
could still provoke federal criminal prosecution. However, utilities are
obligated to protect their customers and should do so even in the face of
conflict between state and federal governments.
B. OFFERING INCENTIVES TO MARIJUANA GROWS
Utilities can protect customers by taking the necessary steps to re-
duce instances of power theft, and promote efficiency in the marijuana
industry to curb high energy consumption. With the decriminalization or
legalization of marijuana cultivation in more states, growers will increas-
ingly divest themselves from theft and off-grid power sources; instead,
growers will simply plug into the grid for electricity.171 In turn, this bur-
geoning industry’s energy consumption will grow exponentially.172
Some utilities, like Snohomish County Public Utilities District, fear
that providing incentives like cash rebates to marijuana grows would
cause them to clash with the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). A
conflict with BPA could jeopardize millions of dollars in federal grants
for other projects unrelated to marijuana, such as tidal and geothermal
energy or smart-grid and energy-efficiency programs.173 BPA, the largest
power marketer in the Pacific Northwest and the supplier of one-half of
the funding for the Northwest Energy Efficiency Alliance, stated that it
will not reimburse the 140 public utilities that are its customers due to
the federal ban on marijuana.174
Even though federal law prohibits marijuana cultivation, state popu-
lations continue to decriminalize or legalize marijuana. Individual states
continue to act as laboratories for marijuana policy development,
prompting local governments, utilities, and others to take their own mea-
sures. For instance, Colorado’s Boulder County enacted a cannabis car-
171 Warren, supra note 28, at 405.
172 Id. at 403.
173 David Ferris, Utilities struggle to control appetites in energy-hungry marijuana industry,
E&E PUBLISHING LLC (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060004230.
174 Ted Sickinger, Powering pot: Growers will gobble electricity, THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 5,
2015, http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2015/09/powering_pot_growers_will_gobb
.html.
25
Dadgari: Powering Mary Jane
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2018
80 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 10
bon tax.175 Investor-owned Xcel Energy Inc., the major electricity
provider in Colorado, admitted to giving rebates to marijuana growers,
though it refused to disclose the amounts.176 Both Puget Sound Energy
and Avista, investor-owned utilities in Washington State, provided grow-
ers with significant rebates funded by fees on their own customers in-
stead of the government.177 Energy Trust of Oregon, a non-profit
organization, coordinates efficiency programs for customers of Portland
General Electric and PacifiCorp, conducting technical studies and pro-
viding rebates for lighting upgrades to medical marijuana growers.178
In providing for the economic welfare and safety of their residents,
states have traditionally had the authority to regulate public utilities and
determine state energy policies.179 Because electric energy is an essential
service that is “affected with the public interest,” states and utilities must
take steps to ensure reliable electric energy service at a reasonable price
to all consumers.180 Therefore, states and public utilities can incentivize
marijuana grows in the effort to promote energy efficiency and reduce
the average energy consumption of marijuana cultivation. When federal
agencies such as BPA are not willing to reimburse public utilities for
energy efficiency incentives, states should levy a tax like the cannabis
carbon tax enacted by Boulder County. States could also allow public
utilities to tax all electric energy customers to fund a rebate program until
Congress can be swayed to change the law. Without a change allowing
for the decriminalization or legalization of marijuana, grows will con-
tinue to negatively impact the energy industry, placing other customers at
risk and consuming energy at a rate that will inevitably strain the power
grid.
V. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF MARIJUANA GROWS ON THE ENERGY
INDUSTRY
Without legislation for the legalization or decriminalization of mari-
juana that allows public utilities to serve and incentivize growers free
and clear of federal enforcement, marijuana grows will increasingly have
a negative impact on the energy industry due to high energy consumption
with little or no incentive to become more efficient. The high-energy
175 Hillary Borrud, Power needs of pot industry raise issues with Energy Dept., utilities, EAST
OREGONIAN, Apr. 26, 2015, http://www.eastoregonian.com/eo/capital-bureau/20150426/power-
needs-of-pot-industry-raise-issues-with-energy-dept-utilities.
176 Ferris, supra note 173.
177 Id.
178 Sickinger, supra note 174.
179 Schmidt, supra note 88, at 618.
180 Id. at 575.
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consumption of marijuana grows inevitably causes cultivators to evade
steep power bills and avoid detection from enforcement agencies. These
problems will continue to plague both industries in all states, whether
marijuana is decriminalized or not.
A. HIGH-ENERGY CONSUMPTION OF GROWS
According to the preeminent researcher, Evan Mills, an expert on
the energy use of marijuana grows, the budding industry of indoor mari-
juana cultivation is a highly energy intensive process in which cultivators
attempt to control environmental conditions throughout the life-cycle of
the plants.181 The criminalization of marijuana pushes cultivators to grow
indoors in an effort to conceal their actions.182 Criminalization is also
responsible for energy inefficiencies of the marijuana cultivation process.
Transporting small volumes of product over long distances and taking
measures that undercut ventilation efficiencies to suppress noise and
odor leads to the use of diesel generators for off-grid power produc-
tion.183 These generators produce more greenhouse-gas emissions and
are far less efficient than many electric grids.184 It currently takes ap-
proximately 4,600 kg of carbon dioxide emissions to produce about one
kilogram of processed marijuana buds; when cumulated across all na-
tional production, this equals the emissions of 3 million average cars in
the U.S.185 Mills explains that energy is used in many aspects of the
indoor growing process and cites high-intensity lighting, dehumidifica-
tion to rid grow rooms of water vapor and to prevent mold formation,
heating or cooling grow rooms and drying rooms, pre-heating water used
for irrigation, and air-conditioning and ventilation for removing waste
heat.186
With lighting levels equivalent to those in hospital operating rooms
and hourly air changes greater than 60 times the rate of the modern
home, Mills estimates that the power densities of indoor marijuana grows
are equal to modern data centers.187 His research approximates that in-
door marijuana grows use about 20 terawatt hours of energy annually,
181 Evan Mills, The Carbon Footprint of Indoor Cannabis Production, 46 ENERGY POL’Y 58
(2012), http://evanmills.lbl.gov/pubs/pdf/cannabis-carbon-footprint.pdf.
182 Evan Mills, Energy up in Smoke: The Carbon Footprint of Indoor Cannabis Production -
Frequently Asked Questions, http://evan-mills.com/energy-associates/Indoor.html (last visited Nov.
10, 2015).
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Mills, supra note 181, at 58.
186 Id. at 59.
187 Id.
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including off-grid production.188 This consumption matches the output of
seven large electric power plants, or the consumption of 2 million aver-
age American homes.189 He estimates that indoor marijuana grows ac-
count for more than $6 billion or more than one percent of annual
electricity consumption nationally.190 Indoor cultivation is responsible
for approximately three percent of all electricity used in California, the
top-producing state of marijuana grown indoors.191 This is the equivalent
of the energy used in 1 million average Californian homes and expendi-
tures on energy equating to $3 billion per year.192 In the U.S., indoor
marijuana cultivation uses six times as much energy as the pharmaceuti-
cal sector, approximately eight times more energy per foot than the stan-
dard commercial building, four times more than the average hospital, and
eighteen times more than the average home.193
1. Illegal Grows Stealing Electricity
The darker side of the narrative is the increased instances of power
theft due to the high-energy consumption of marijuana grows. Canadian
based BC Hydro declared that between 2006 and 2010, there were more
than 2,600 thefts of electricity, the majority allegedly from marijuana
growers. BC Hydro reported that electricity losses increased from around
500 gigawatt-hours to at least 850 gigawatt-hours, costing the company
approximately $100 million a year.194 This is not an isolated event. Onta-
rio, Canada also estimates that power theft for all purposes, including a
good portion of theft for the cultivation of marijuana, results in $500
million in losses.195 While U.S. estimates are hard to obtain, theft is
thought to account for up to $6 billion in losses nationally.196
Like other electric utilities, BC Hydro cites several problems with
marijuana grow operations, including: electricity theft by cultivators that
wish to avoid detection from officials; safety risks created for utility em-
ployees, first responders, and the public; damage to the grid, such as
power surges and electrical failure that can damage a utility’s equipment
and cause power outages; and the waste of electricity, which the com-
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 60.
191 Id. at 59.
192 Id. at 59-60.
193 Id. at 62.
194 Peter Kelly-Detwiler, Electricity Theft: A Bigger Issue Than You Think, FORBES, Apr. 23,
2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterdetwiler/2013/04/23/electricity-theft-a-bigger-issue-than-
you-think/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).
195 Id.
196 Id.
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pany says is an “affront to the conservation efforts of legitimate custom-
ers.”197 Theft of electricity is a concern for utility customers as well,
because it increases electricity prices for legitimate consumers.198 While
theft of electricity is a significant and persistent concern, BC Hydro and
other utilities reduce losses with a number of different strategies, such as
setting up anonymous tip lines, implementing new technology such as
theft-detecting system meters and smart meters, and creating revenue
protection units that visit suspect locations and inspect them for electrical
theft.199
B. CURBING THE HIGH-ENERGY CONSUMPTION OF GROWS
In addition to minimizing waste through power theft, utilities fre-
quently grapple with the high-energy consumption of marijuana
grows.200 According to the Mills study, lighting is responsible for thirty-
three percent of the energy used for indoor marijuana grows.201 While
lighting is not the only culprit to blame for high-energy use, it is the most
prominent piece of equipment and the grower’s largest expense.202 Each
bulb of an indoor grow light, whether it is high-pressure sodium, high-
intensity discharge, or metal halide, consumes 1,000 watts or more of
electricity.203 Besides using large amounts of electricity, the lights pro-
duce a large amount of heat that must be vacated from grow rooms with
fans and air conditioners, which consume energy as well.204 With no
current national standards in place for horticultural lighting, utilities and
other energy organizations must take on the risky task of promoting and
incentivizing efficient energy use in the marijuana industry.205
Investor-owned utilities currently offer cash incentives in the form
of rebates for energy efficient equipment in state-legal marijuana indus-
tries in Colorado, Washington, and Oregon.206 While some investor-
owned utilities are pressing forward and offering cash rebates, public
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Ferris, supra note 173.
201 Mills, supra note 181, at 60.
202 Ferris, supra note 173.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.; see also Lisa Cohn, Addressing the Energy-Intensive Marijuana Industry in Oregon,
ENERGY EFFICIENCY MARKETS (Jul. 28, 2015), http://energyefficiencymarkets.com/addressing-en-
ergy-intensive-marijuana-industry/ (Energy Trust of Oregon already offers legal medical marijuana
facilities that seek to save energy and reduce costs incentives through their Production Efficiency
program).
206 Id.
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utilities generally refrain from doing so, citing concerns of federal crimi-
nal prosecution and the loss of federal grant money to the state.207 In
today’s society, although often overlooked, electricity is a unique and
essential element that touches every aspect of modern life.208 When a
shortfall jeopardizes the safety and welfare of a state, that state’s govern-
ment must act to protect its public interest.209
VI. CONCLUSION
While it is unlikely that a utility that simply supplies electricity to a
marijuana business would be implicated for racketeering or aiding and
abetting, the federal government could take explicit steps to protect utili-
ties that are acting strictly within their state mandates. For instance,
FERC could issue an order stating that utilities are protected from prose-
cution if acting strictly within their state regulatory directives to provide
electricity to all state-legal entities within their service territory. Con-
gress could pass legislation authorizing public utilities and other recog-
nized businesses to engage in commerce with marijuana businesses in
states that have legalized marijuana, so long as their actions amount to
hands-off involvement in providing the types of services that any recog-
nized legal business would require. A third and possibly more promising
approach would be for the Supreme Court to create a bright-line rule
offering public utilities and other service providers protection from fed-
eral prosecution, so long as their involvement amounts to the same type
of hands-off service they provide other legally recognized businesses.
For utilities, this would essentially amount to an affirmation that electric
energy service for grows is to be treated the same as other customers.210
Further, full federal decriminalization or legalization would create
new possibilities for protecting citizens, because it would allow the mari-
juana industry to address energy issues through legitimate regulatory
measures such as codes, standards, and incentives. These measures
would help reduce energy use and its by-products. In addition,
decriminalizing or legalizing marijuana would allow state legal mari-
juana businesses to operate by the same rules as other federally recog-
nized legal businesses, and eliminate the conflict between marijuana
businesses and those currently recognized businesses like public utilities.
Instead of making federally recognized legal businesses choose between
207 Id.
208 Schmidt, supra note 88, at 573; see also Energy Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market
Basics, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, 2 (July 2015), https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/
energy-primer.pdf (stating that consumers cannot eliminate consumption and have few substitutes).
209 Id.
210 Mills, supra note 181.
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abiding by federal or state law, Congress should observe the voice of the
national population and decriminalize or legalize marijuana. Without
Congressional action, law-abiding public utilities that are merely fulfil-
ling their state statutory obligations will likely still face uncertainty in
business operations and the lingering threat of federal litigation.
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